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1. INTRODUCTION
Starting from Stigler (1961), economists have devoted considerable e¤ort to the study of
markets with consumer search. The literature, focusing on inspection goods for which
all product and price information can be uncovered before purchase, has shown that search
friction is a major source of market power and its reduction generally improves welfare.
However, little is known about how search markets work for experience goods, the quality
of which can be learned only after consumption. This is rather surprising, considering that
goods are increasingly bought through the Internet, where product variety is greater but
quality is arguably more di¢cult to assess than in brick-and-mortar stores, and consequently
consumers may nd a desired product variety through search but not observe its quality
before purchase. Despite their high promise for e¢ciency due to small search cost, online
markets are plagued by problems of low-quality sellers and low-quality products.1 This
raises the critical question of whether (further) decreases in search cost could (eventually)
restore e¢ciency or, instead, regulatory policies can enhance market performance even as
search friction vanishes.
We present a model in which products are di¤erentiated both horizontally (variety) and
vertically (quality), and consumers can observe product variety through search but not
quality. Product quality is either high or low, and a consumers match value from a variety
is a random draw from some known distribution. A high-quality product will function
properly to deliver its match value to the consumer (her utility from the product), whereas
a low-quality product contains a hidden defect that is uncovered only after consumption and
diminishes the products utility.2 A rm can invest to become a high-quality producer whose
1The U.S. General Accounting O¢ce reported in 2018 that 40% of products it purchased in an investi-
gation from independent sellers on ve major e-commerce websites, including Amazon and Walmart, were
fake or low-quality (GAO 18-216). A recent Wall Street Journal investigation found more than 4,000 items
sold by independent sellers on Amazon had safety and other serious quality problems (Amazon Has Ceded
Control of Its Site. The Result: Thousands of Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products. Wall Street Journal,
August 23, 2019).
2For example, the product could be some furniture or clothing that has many styles (varieties). By
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product quality is more likely to be high (so the product has a higher expected quality), and
rms di¤er in investment costs. While consumers cannot observe product quality before
purchase, they are in the market at di¤erent time periods and the later purchasers can learn
about the quality reputation of a rm from its past sales.
This is the rst model to introduce experience goods into a search framework, and it
yields new insights on how search markets function. In equilibrium, consumers conduct
sequential search for their desired variety with a reservation value that reects search cost
and expected product quality, where the latter depends on the portion of high-quality rms.
Despite quality uncertainty, we show that equilibrium price can be neatly characterized
given average rm quality in the market. An increase in average rm quality leads to more
consumer search for variety and more intense price competition, but it can nevertheless raise
equilibrium price due to a new demand e¤ect thatas explained laterexists for experience
but not for inspection goods. Moreover, while in both cases higher search frictions lead to
lower match values and higher price but also to stronger incentive for rms to invest in
quality, the welfare impact is strikingly di¤erent for experience goods. We show that, under
plausible conditions, consumer and total welfare both initially increasethough eventually
decreasein search cost, in sharp contrast to the insight from the existing literature on
inspection goods.
The mechanism behind our novel result on how search frictions impact welfare for expe-
rience goods can be explained in two steps as follows: First, as search cost rises, consumers
search less for their desired variety and rms also soften their price competition, resulting in
lower match values and higher prices for consumers, both being harmful as in the existing
literature. But a higher price raises the return to the reputation for being a high-quality
seller and hence the investment incentive,3 leading to more high-quality rms in the market
and a larger probability that consumers will purchase a high-quality product even before
searching a rm, consumers observe the style of its product, but can uncover a defect only after consumption.
This provides a new and convenient way of modeling search for experience goods that are di¤erentiated both
horizontally and vertically. We shall normalize the utility of a low-quality product to zero.
3 It has been recognized, in studies without search cost, that reputation can provide rms with incentives
to furnish high quality for experience goods (e.g., Choi, 1998; Shapiro, 1983; Wernerfelt, 1988).
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rms establish reputation. This generates a benecial quality e¤ect, because a consumers
match value from a product can be (fully) materialized only if it has high quality.
Second, to understand why the quality e¤ect dominates under lowbut not highsearch
cost, notice that as search cost tends to zero, so does the price markup, and hence the portion
of high-quality rms is small because only rms with very small investment cost can prot
from investing in quality. A rm will thus have a big boost in sales from establishing a high-
quality reputation. Therefore, for the same price increase resulting from a marginal rise in
search cost, a rm investing in high quality gains disproportionately moreand hence the
quality e¤ect of increasing search cost is much strongerwhen search cost is su¢ciently low
than when it is relatively high.
To clarify the crucial role of quality observability in determining how search friction af-
fects welfare, we also consider the case of inspection goods by assuming instead that product
quality is observed before purchase. We show that consumer and total welfare then decrease
monotonically when search cost increases, as in the existing literature. Importantly, for in-
spection goods a higher search cost also motivates more rms to make quality investment by
boosting its returns, and higher average rm quality benets consumers by enabling them
to search fewer rms before nding a high-quality product. Why, then, is the relation-
ship between search cost and welfare so di¤erent? As our analysis reveals, when product
quality is observable, consumers can avoid the utility loss from a low-quality product by
not purchasing it, and hence they do not gain as much from increases in rm quality as
they would when searching for experience goods. Consequently, the direct e¤ect of a higher
search cost to reduce search e¢ciency dominates its indirect e¤ect of raising search e¢ciency
through the increase in average rm quality. Higher search costs then always harm welfare
by decreasing match values and increasing price.
We further show that equilibrium investment for quality is (socially) decient when search
cost is low, which is consistent with the result from the literature on experience goods
wherewithout search frictionsrms typically invest too little in quality (e.g., Riordan,
1986; Shapiro, 1982). However, we also nd that quality investment can be excessive when
search cost is relatively high, contrary to the conventional wisdom. To understand the latter
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result, notice that while more high-quality rms in the market can benet consumers, the
higher total investment cost harms industry prot. When search cost is high, consumers
have relatively low match values from their chosen varieties. They thus benet less when
an increase in (average) rm quality raises the probability that the match values are ma-
terialized, but the private investment incentive is high due to the high prot margin from
being a high-quality rm. The negative welfare e¤ect of higher investment cost can thus
dominate when search cost is high.
Product di¤erentiation and quality uncertainty are prominent features of search markets.
Wolinsky (1986) is an early contribution to the study of consumer search for horizontally
di¤erentiated products (for related contributions, see, e.g., Anderson and Renault, 1999;
Armstrong et al., 2009; Haan and Moraga-González, 2011; Rhodes, 2011). Recent papers
have analyzed consumer search across vertically-di¤erentiated rms (e.g., Athey and Ellison,
2011; Chen and He, 2011), under both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation (e.g., Eliaz and
Spiegler, 2011; Bar-Isaac et al., 2012; Chen and Zhang, 2018), or with investment in product
quality (e.g., Fishman and Levy, 2015; Moraga-González and Sun, 2019)4. All of these and
other studies in the search literature assume that consumers will learn all information about
a product through search before making a purchase.
Our model advances the literature in an important new direction, and our results provide
new perspectives on how search frictions impact market performance. In the existing litera-
ture, reductions in search cost benet consumers and welfare even when a lower search cost
sometimes leads to higher market price (e.g., Chen and Zhang, 2011; Bar-Isaac et al., 2012;
Zhou, 2014; Moraga-González, et al., 2017; Choi, et al., 2018), or when it lowers product
quality (e.g., Fishman and Levy, 2015; Moraga-González and Sun, 2019). In our model,
there are also important consumer and e¢ciency benets from reducing search friction, but
there can be o¤setting factors via the e¤ect on investment in quality. Consequently, for
experience goods, decreases in search cost beyond a certain point will actually reduce both
4Relatedly, Wolinsky (2005) and Moraga-González and Sun (2018) study consumer search models in
which sellers exert costly e¤orts to create service plans.
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consumer and total welfare.5 In fact, in our model the presence of some search friction is
necessary in order for either consumer or total welfare to be maximized.
One might wonder whether search intermediaries would alleviate the product quality
distortions. Previous research has shown that a monopoly search intermediary improves
search e¢ciency when rms o¤er inspection goods and di¤er in the probability that their
product is of high quality (e.g., Athey and Ellison, 2011; Chen and He, 2011). As in these
studies, in our model an intermediary may improve welfare by screening out low-quality
sellers. However, we show that it is also possible for the intermediary to exacerbate the
distortion, because the fee it charges can reduce the sellers investment return, resulting in
(even) fewer rms who invest in quality.
Digital technology and the Internet have drastically reduced search cost and expanded
consumers reach for product variety. Despite their tremendous benets to consumers and
society, online markets are not without perils. In particular, online markets appear to
be especially plagued by the presence of many low-quality sellers. Our results show that
reductions in search cost could indeed result in lower average seller quality and product
quality in online markets, but they will nevertheless boost consumer and total welfare if
consumers can observe product quality before purchase. However, many products sold
online can be considered as experience goods, the quality of which is not observed before
purchase. Our results suggest that for such products reduced search frictions can actually
decrease welfare, and the quality problem is unlikely to disappear by itself even if search
cost virtually vanishes. Rather, there can be substantial welfare gains from regulations
that, for example, impose minimum quality standards and product liability (as we discuss
further in section 6).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present our search model of
experience goods, in which there are two periods, a rms quality is endogenously deter-
mined by its private investment at the beginning of the rst period, and rms have quality
5Taylor (2017) considers a model in which a seller can manipulate the browsing cost (search cost) of
potential buyers. He shows that a higher browsing cost, by driving away less serious buyers and increasing
the sales e¤ort of the seller, can benet consumers and increase welfare.
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reputation in period 2 from their sales in period 1. The model is readily adaptable to the
case of inspection goods, providing a unied framework for studying consumer search under
quality uncertainty. In section 3, we analyze sequential consumer search and price compe-
tition in a benchmark where the average rm quality in the market is exogenously given.
In addition to its intrinsic interest, this analysis provides the basis for the study of our full
model under endogenous rm quality and reputation, conducted in section 4, where our
main welfare results are established. We extend the model to include a search intermediary
in section 5, and conclude in section 6. Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2. THE MODEL
The market contains a unit mass of rms and operates for two periods, 1 and 2. A rms
product quality, q; can be either high (H) or low (L); respectively with probability  and
1 ; where  2 fh; lg and 0  l < h  1: Thus, h and l correspond to a high- and a
low-quality rm, respectively.6 Initially, all rms have  = l; but at the beginning of period
1, each rm can privately make a one-time investment that costs x to permanently increase
its quality from l to h; where x is a privately-observed random draw from distribution
G (x) ; with density g (x) > 0 on [0; x] for some x 2 (0;1) : Each rms quality, ; is then
determined and remains as the rms private information. Production cost is normalized
to zero.
In each period, a distinct unit mass of consumers are present in the market.7 Each
consumer desires to purchase one unit of the product. A consumers value for an H product
is v; which is a random draw from cumulative distribution function F (v) ; and her value
6Hence, we draw a distinction between rm quality () and product quality (q). Our model nests the
case where a high-quality rm only produces q = H while a low-quality rm only produces q = L, with
h = 1 and l = 0. We allow more general values of h and l so that there can be quality uncertainty for
both types of rms.
7Each consumer thus purchases only once by assumption. We can extend the analysis to situations
where (some) consumers may purchase in both periods, but this would complicate analysis because a con-
sumers search strategy would then depend on her likelihood of repeat purchases (from the same rm). Our
assumption allows us to focus on how the experience nature of goods impacts consumer search.
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for an L product is normalized to zero. That is, a consumers utility from a product is
u (q) =
8<
: v if q = H0 if q = L :
Hence, rms are di¤erentiated both horizontally and vertically, respectively because each
consumers v is independently drawn across rms and because a high-quality rm ( = h)
is more likely to produce a high-quality product (q = H). We assume that F (v) has
corresponding density f (v) > 0 on [0; v] ; with 0 < v <1.
To focus on experience goods, we assume that an H product and an L product from the
same rm have the same appearance. By searching a rm, a consumer learns her v for
the rms product and the rms price. She knows that her utility from the product is v
if q = H and 0 if q = L; and she can observe q only after purchase.8 Each search costs
the consumer s > 0. In each period, rms simultaneously and independently choose prices,
after which consumers may conduct sequential search and make purchases. To capture the
idea that rms can establish quality reputation, we assume that the period-1 consumers will
furnish product reviews about whether q = H or L for each rms product.9 In period 2, a
new cohort of consumers, who replace the period-1 consumers, can observe these product
reviews before conducting search. All values in period 2, when discounted to period 1, have
a common discount factor  > 0:10
A rms strategy species its investment decision, based on its investment cost x; and its
prices p1 and p2 (possibly contingent on its ) in the two periods. A period-1 consumers
strategy species her search and purchase decisions, whereas period-2 consumers may base
these decisions also on observed product reviews. At a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, each
rms strategy maximizes its discounted sum of prot, holding beliefs about other rms
8This reects the experience nature of the product. Products from di¤erent rms may have di¤erent
appearances or styles that reect horizontal di¤erentiation. We assume purchase and consumption occur
in the same period.
9Our results will be the same whether all period-1 consumers or a randomly-drawn portion of them will
publicly reveal their product experiences. For ease of exposition, we assume all of them will.
10We may consider period 2 as combining all possible future periods after period 1 for which rms have
established quality reputation, in which case  could be higher than 1.
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and consumers strategies; each consumers strategy maximizes her surplus (at any point of
her sequential decision process), holding beliefs about rms qualities and prices; and beliefs
are consistent with strategies along the equilibrium path.
One desirable feature of our model is that it can be readily adapted to the study of
inspection goods. In fact, if consumers were able to observe product quality (q) before
purchase by searching the rm, our model would become one of search for inspection goods.
In the case of inspection goods, we may interpret  as the probability that the rms product
meets each consumers needs, so that a higher quality rmwhose product has a broader
appeal to consumers has a higher ; as in Chen and He (2011). Our formulation allows
us to compare results for experience and inspection goods in a unied framework, and to
uncover how quality observability matters for the functioning of search markets.
We analyze our model in two steps. First, as a benchmark, we study in section 3 consumer
search and price competition in a single period of our model in which exogenously given
portions of G and 1   G rms have  = h and  = l, respectively, for G 2 [0; 1]. This
analysis has its independent interest, and it will provide the basis for the full analysis of
our model in section 4 with two periods and endogenous G.
3. SEARCH AND PRICE UNDER GIVEN AVERAGE FIRM QUALITY
This section analyzes consumer search and price competition under given average rm
quality.
3.1 Search Equilibrium for Experience Goods
Consider a single period of our model, in which a given G 2 [0; 1] portion of rms have
 = h: The average rm quality in the market is then given as:
 = Gh + (1 G)l: (1)
For given ; we rst consider consumers search strategy. As in search models for in-
spection goods in which rms are horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated (e.g., Eliaz and
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Spiegler, 2011; Chen and Zhang, 2018), we focus on a uniform-price equilibrium where all
rms charge the same price p ; and we shall discuss the motivation for this equilibrium
when characterizing p later: Each consumers equilibrium search strategy, holding belief
p , solves the following dynamic search problem:
V = max
v
(
 s+ [1  F (v)]
R v
v
(v   p) f (v) dv
[1  F (v)]
+ F (v)V
)
; (2)
where V is a consumers (maximized) continuation value from searching a randomly-
selected rm whose expected quality and price are respectively  and p : The consumer will
sequentially and randomly search sellers, and will purchase when she nds a seller whose
product value v reaches her optimal reservation value v (provided the sellers price is indeed
p): Each search costs s; and under reservation value v ; the search will lead to a purchase
with probability [1  F (v)] while the consumer will search again to receive continuation
value V with probability F (v) : The consumers optimal reservation value v thus satises
the rst-order condition:
  (v   p) f (v) + f (v)V = 0:
It follows that the consumers continuation value, which is also the surplus for a consumer
to engage in search or to participate in the market, is
V = v   p ; (3)
and in equilibrium V  0 to ensure consumers participation in the market. Combining (2)
and (3), we obtain
s =   [1  F (v)]V +
Z v
v
(v   p) f (v) dv ,
which can be re-stated as the following condition for the optimal reservation value in search:

Z v
v
(v   v) f (v) dv = s: (4)
The left-hand side of equation (4) is the consumers expected benet from one more search
when she is currently at a seller with v , which decreases in v ; while s is the marginal
9
cost of the extra search. The condition extends the optimal search rule for horizontally
di¤erentiated products (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986), which is a special case of equation (4) when
 = 1: As we clarify shortly, when s < swhich we shall assumefor some positive number
s, there exists a unique v 2 (0; v) that solves (4) and indeed V > 0.
Consider next the pricing strategy by rms. At the proposed uniform-price equilibrium,
consumers will have reservation value v at any rm she searches that charges price p ;
holding the equilibrium belief that all rms have expected quality  and price p : Now
suppose that a rm deviates to a price p: The consumers purchase decision at this rm will
partly depend on her belief about the rms ; as well as on her belief about other rms
prices and qualities following the deviation. The concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
which we adopt, does not constrain beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, potentially resulting in
multiple equilibria. To overcome this well-known problem in dynamic games of imperfect
information, we assume that consumers hold passive belief o¤ the equilibrium path: at
the deviating rm with price p; each consumer believes that (i) the rm deviating to price
p continues to have the expected quality ; and (ii) any other rm continues to charge price
p with expected quality :
Part (ii) above follows from the standard assumption in consumer search for di¤erentiated
products (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986), where following the deviation by one rm the other rms
are expected to continue with the equilibrium price; and the expected quality of any such
rm would then continue to be .11 Part (i) of the assumption is motivated by the following
consideration. In our model, if a price deviation is protable for one  type, it will be equally
protable for the other  type. Thus, if the consumer believes the expected quality of the
deviating rm to be, say, B (p; p) ; this belief can be consistent with protable deviation
only if B (p; p) = . It is thus reasonable to assume that, observing a deviating price
p; consumers will hold belief B (p; p) = : In other words, we require consumers o¤-
11Janssen and Ke (2020) also assume a passive belief in a consumer search model in which rms may choose
to provide a service that other rms can free-ride on. In their model, when observing a rms deviation on
service provision or/and price, consumers continue to believe that other rms maintain their equilibrium
decisions
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equilibrium belief to be consistent with rms incentives: B (p; p) is equal to the expected
quality of rms that can (weakly) benet from the deviation.12
Under passive belief, the consumer, who has arrived at a rm with price p and value v,
will purchase from the rm if
v   p  v   p  0:
Thus, the demand for the rm with price p from any visiting consumer, given that all other
rms charge p ; is
D (p; p) = 1  F

v + p  p


;
with D (p ; p) = 1 F (v) : The prot for a rm of quality  from any visiting consumer,
 (p; p) = pD (p; p) ; is maximized when p satises
@ (p; p)
@p
= 1  F

v + p  p


  p
1

f

v + p  p


= 0:
At the uniform-price equilibrium, p = p ; and
p = 
1  F (v)
f (v)
: (5)
Moreover, if 1   F (v) is log-concave, or, equivalently, the inverse hazard rate is (weakly)
decreasing:
0 (v)  0 for  (v) 
1  F (v)
f (v)
; (6)
then  (p; p) is single-peaked at p ; the uniform-price equilibrium with p = p exists
uniquely, and p is (weakly) lower when consumers search more intensively (i.e., v is
higher). Moreover, at the unique p ;
V = v   p = v    (v) =  [v    (v)] :
12 In the literature on experience goods, rms can sometimes signal their quality through price and other
devices (e.g., Choi, 1998; Riordan, 1988; Shapiro, 1983; Wernerfelt, 1988). In our model, given their qualities,
rms are symmetric in all other aspects and there exists no signal that could potentially separate them. We
will show formally in Proposition 1 below that there can be no separating equilibrium in our model for a
given .
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The highest possible search cost (s) and its corresponding (lowest possible) reservation value
(v0) are dened as
s  
Z v
v0
(v   v0) f (v) dv; where v0 
1  F (v0)
f (v0)
: (7)
Then, for any s < s; there is a unique v 2 (0; v) that solves (4) and V > 0; so that
consumers will indeed engage in search when average rm quality in the market is  2
[l; h] : We shall maintain assumptions (6) and s < s throughout the paper.
In equilibrium, each rms prot is
 =
X
i
[F (v)]
i pD (p ; p) =  (v) ;
where [F (v)]
i is the number of consumers for whom the seller is their is visit. We measure
consumer welfare and total welfare respectively by aggregate consumer surplus and total
surplus. For a market with a unit measure of consumers and of rms under average rm
quality ; industry prot, consumer welfare and total welfare are respectively:
 =  (v) ; V =  [v    (v)] ; W = v : (8)
The result below summarizes the above discussions, and it further establishes that there
can be no separating equilibrium under the following extended passive-belief assumption
for the case where rms with di¤erent  charge di¤erent prices: At a potential separating
equilibrium where h and l rms respectively charge ph 6= pl; following a deviating price
p in the (small) neighborhoods of ph or pl; we say that the o¤-equilibrium belief satises the
extended passive-belief assumption if consumers believe the deviation to have been made
respectively by a h or l rm.
Proposition 1 There is a unique uniform-price equilibrium in the experience-goods market
where average rm quality is : At the equilibrium, consumers search sequentially with
reservation value v and each rm charges price p. Moreover, under the extended passive-
belief assumption, there can be no equilibrium where h and l rms charge di¤erent prices.
A separating equilibrium with di¤erent prices for di¤erent  types cannot exist in our
model, because there is nothing to enable such separation. Given average rm quality,
12
the equilibrium in our search model of experience goods is essentially unique and is the
uniform-price equilibrium.13
3.2 Impacts of Search Cost and Average Firm Quality
We next consider how the equilibrium may vary with search cost s for given rm quality
or with average rm quality  for given s. From (4), consumers reservation value, v ;
increases in  and decreases in s: Because p =  (v) and 
0 ()  0; it follows from (8)
that, given ; p and  increase in s whereas V and W decrease in s: Intuitively, a
higher search cost reduces consumer search e¢ciency, which not only reduces consumers
reservation value in search but also lessens competition and raises price. The higher price
and lower search e¢ciency reduce consumer surplus, and the lower search e¢ciency also
reduces total welfare; whereas higher price boosts prot.
From (8), clearly V and W increase in ; the average quality of rms in the market.
The e¤ects of  on price (and prot) are less obvious, as we can see, from (5):
dp
d
=  (v) + 
0 (v)
@v
@
;
where the rst and the second terms on the RHS reect, respectively, the positive (direct)
demand e¤ect and the negative (indirect) search e¤ect on p from an increase in : A higher
 lowers the price elasticity of demand for given v
14:
 =  
@D (p; p)
@p
p
D

p=p
=
p
 (v)
;
which positively impact price; but it also increases the search reservation value v and
13Our no-separating-equilibrium result also holds if, following a deviating price p at the proposed separating
equilibrium, consumers believe that the deviating rm has quality : Search models are known to contain an
equilibrium where all rms charge very high prices and no consumer engages in search. We do not consider
such uninteresting equilibrium.
14When  is higher, the quality-adjusted price p

is lower and a marginal change in p is associated with
less change in p

and hence leads to less change in the quantity demanded.
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negatively impacts p due to 
0 (v)  0: Because
@v
@
=
R v
v
[1  F (v)] dv
 [1  F (v)]
<
v   v

;
a su¢cientbut not necessarycondition for
@p
@ > 0 is
1
v   v
  
0 (v)
 (v)
; (9)
which holds, for example, if F (v) is a uniform or exponential distribution: The proceeding
discussions lead to the following:
Corollary 1 In equilibrium: (i) given average rm quality , price and prot increase,
while V and W decrease, in s; (ii) given s; a higher  leads to higher price and prot if
(9) holds, even though v is higher and  (v) lower; moreover, V and W increase in .
With exogenously-given rm quality for experience goods, the e¤ects of search friction on
price and welfare are similar to those in search markets for inspection goods.15 Notably, p
increases in  under (9), despite increased consumer search and price competition;16 this is
in contrast to the result under search for inspection goods, to which we turn next.
3.3 Comparing with Search for Inspection Goods
We now consider inspection goods, also under exogeneously-given rm quality, by assum-
ing that searching a rm enables a consumer to learn whether its q is H or L; in addition to
uncovering its price and v. Everything else is the same as in subsection 3.1. In particular,
 2 fl; hg continues to be a rms quality and remains to be its private information,
with  being the average rm quality in the market as dened in (1). We again look for
a uniform-price equilibrium, where each rm charges price pI : As in subsection 3.1, con-
sumers optimal search follows a reservation-value strategy, with the optimal reservation
15When we return to our full model in section 4, under endogenous rm quality and reputation, search
costs have rather surprising welfare e¤ects for experience goods, in contrast to those for inspection goods.
16However, as Corollary 1 indicated, despite the higher prices, an increase in  nevertheless results in
higher consumer and total welfare.
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value vI satisfying

Z v
vI
 
v   vI

f (v) dv = s: (10)
Interestingly, this condition is identical to condition (4) for experience goods. This is
because when arriving at a rm with v = vI = v ; the expected marginal benet of an
additional search is the same under inspection and experience goods.17 In other words,
given  and s; v = v
I
 :
To determine the demand for each rm, suppose a rm deviates with price p: The passive
belief assumption is now needed only for its part (ii)other rms price is still pIbecause
when searching the rm a consumer learns its product quality q: A visiting consumer will
purchase from the rm if she nds q = H (which occurs with the rms probability ) and
v   p  vI   p
I
 :
The rms demand from any visiting consumer is thus
DI
 
p; pI

= 

1  F
 
vI + p  pI1

;
and it chooses p to maximize pDI
 
p; pI

; which, in equilibrium, leads to
pI =
1  F
 
vI

f
 
vI
 =   vI : (11)
Since a random visit by a consumer to a rm will on average result in a purchase with
probability 

1  F
 
vI

; and since all consumerswhose total mass is onepurchase;
the equilibrium output of a rm with quality  is
DI(pI ;pI)
[1 F (vI)]
=  ; and hence the rms
equilibrium prot is I () = 
 
vI

. Thus, a rm will have a higher prot than an
average rm if its quality  is higher than the market average, in contrast to the case of
experience goods where a rms equilibrium prot is independent of its .
Notice that the price elasticity of demand here is independent of ; in contrast to that
for experience goods, which explains why pI does not depend on  but p does. Therefore,
17However, as we shall see shortly, equilibrium consumer and social welfare are both higher for inspection
than for experience goods, because for the former consumers can detect and hence avoid the utility loss from
consuming a low quality product.
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for inspection goods it is always true that
dpI
d
= 0
 
vI
 @vI
@
 0;
in contrast to
@p
@ > 0 for experience goods under condition (9). However, given ; an
increase in s reduces match value (vI) and raises price (p
I
), as for experience goods.
In equilibrium, industry prot, consumer surplus, and total welfare are respectively
I = 
 
vI

; V I = v
I
   
 
vI

; W I = v
I . (12)
Since vI = v ; comparing p
I
 with p and (12) with (8), we see interesting similarities and
di¤erences in search equilibrium properties between inspection and experience goods, as
follows:
Proposition 2 Given ; consumers search with the same reservation value for inspection
and experience goods, but V , , andW are all lower for the latter. A higher s leads to lower
match value and higher price in both cases. A higher  leads to higher p for experience goods
under condition (9) but to lower p for inspection goods. Moreover, a rms prot increases
in its  under inspection goods but is independent of its  under experience goods.
For inspection goods, a higher average rm quality () in the market implies that con-
sumers will have higher expected benet from a search, because they are more likely to
nd an H-product. This boosts consumers search incentive, as reected by their higher
search reservation value, which increases competition and leads to lower equilibrium price.
Because consumers can observe product quality before purchase, an increase in  will not
a¤ect a consumers demand for a rm. By contrast, for experience goods, product quality
is observed only after consumption, and thus higher  also increases a consumers expected
utility from the product and hence the demand for it. Consequently, while a higher av-
erage rm quality similarly exerts a downward pressure on equilibrium priceby raising
consumers search reservation valueas for inspection goods, it has the additional demand
e¤ect that, on balance, results in higher equilibrium price under condition (9).
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4. ENDOGENOUS FIRM QUALITY AND REPUTATION
We now return to our full model with endogenous rm quality and reputation. Notice
that if it is protable for a rm with a higher x to make the quality investment, it must
also be protable for a rm with a lower x to do so. The equilibrium of our model will thus
have the property that, for some threshold t; a rm will invest x to have h if x  t but
will have l without the investment if x > t: We assume that x is high enough so that in
equilibrium t < x; i.e., some rms (with su¢ciently high realizations of x) will not incur x:
4.1 Market Equilibrium
For a given t; the average rm quality () in the market is
 =  (t)  G (t)h + [1 G (t)]l:
The rst-period equilibrium is then the same as in our preliminary analysis of section 3
with  =  (t), where consumers conduct sequential search with reservation value v and
all rms charge equilibrium price p1 = p :
In the second period, consumers will observe product reviews from period-1 consumers.
For a rm of quality , a portion  of its period-1 customers experienced quality H for
its product. Thus, from the product reviews, period-2 consumers can correctly infer each
rms :18 There will thus e¤ectively be two distinguishable segments of competing rms,
one having quality h and another l: Comparing V from (8) for  = h and  = l;
consumers will clearly receive a higher surplus fromand thus only searchthe segment
of rms with  = h. Thus, in equilibrium, consumers will all rst search the segment of
rms with  = h:
It follows that only h rms will be active sellers in the market in period 2, and consumers
will search them with reservation value vh  vh (s) that uniquely solves
h
Z v
vh
(v   vh) f (v) dv = s: (13)
18We could allow product reviews to be noisy signals or consumer observations of product reviews in period
2 to be noisy signals as well. Our results will remain valid if the noisy signals are su¢ciently accurate.
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Moreover, in equilibrium all h rms charge price
p2 = h (vh) ; (14)
and each earns prot
2 (h) =
h (vh)
G (t)
;
where G (t) is the mass of h rms in the market. Firms with l earn zero prot in period
2.
We next consider the investment choices of rms and determine the threshold t of invest-
ment cost x: Given that rms invest x if and only x  t, if a rm with x acquires h at the
beginning of period 1, it will earn discounted sum of prot
h =  (v) + 
h (vh)
G (t)
  x: (15)
By contrast, if the rm chooses to maintain l without investment, its expected prot is
l =  (v) : (16)
The equilibrium t = t  t (s) is determined by the x at which h = l; or
h (vh) = t
G (t) : (17)
Because average rm quality
   (t) = hG (t
) + l [1 G (t
)] (18)
is endogenous, we modify the denition of s in (7) by re-deningZ v
v0
(v   v0) f (v) dv =
s
 (t (s))
; (19)
where v0   (v0) =
1 F (v0)
f(v0)
; to ensure consumer participation whenever s < s:19 Following
the discussions above, we establish the result below by further showing the existence of t
that solves equation (17).20
19As we shall discuss shortly, s
(t(s))
is likely to be monotonically increasing in s: If it is not, there might
be multiple s that satises (19), in which case we dene s to be the smallest s among them.
20 If  (u) is strictly decreasing, then t is unique.
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Proposition 3 Given s < s; our model has an equilibrium where a rm has  = h if and
only if its x  t = t (s) ; and the average rm quality in period 1 is  (t). Consumers
search with reservation value v and pay price p

1 in period 1, but search only h rms with
reservation value vh and pay p

2 in period 2.
The second-period industry prot, consumer surplus, and total welfare are respectively
2 = h (vh) ; V

2 = h (vh) ; W

2 = vh;
where we dene  (v)  [v    (v)] ; with  (v) > 0 and 0 (v)  1: Their corresponding
discounted sums for the two periods are given by:
 =  (v) + h (vh) 
Z t
0
xdG (x) ; (20)
V  =  (v) + h (vh) ; (21)
W  = v + hvh  
Z t
0
xdG (x) : (22)
In equilibrium, each consumer receives positive (expected) surplus from market partic-
ipation and all rms receive positive prots, while the more e¢cient rms (with x < t)
receive higher prots.
4.2 Impacts of Search Cost
We now consider the impacts of search cost. Utilizing @vh@s =  
1
h[1 F (vh)]
from (13);
@p2
@s
= h
0 (vh)
@vh
@s
=  
0 (vh)
[1  F (vh)]
 0:
Thus, as expected, a higher search cost leads to a higher price in period 2. Since
@t
@s
=
H
0 (vh)
@vh
@s
G (t) + tg (t)
=
 0 (vh)
G (t) + tg (t)
1
[1  F (vh)]
 0; (23)
and @(t
)
@t = G
0 (t) (h   l) > 0; we have
@ (t)
@s
=
@ (t)
@t
@t
@s
 0:
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Therefore, increases in search cost raise average rm quality.21 Intuitively, when s is higher,
price is higher, and a rm has higher prot in period 2 for being a h rm. That is, the
return to the reputation of being a high-quality rm is higher. This motivates more rms
to invest in h; so that t
 becomes higher, which boosts  in period 1.
When  is given exogenously, a higher s leads to a lower v ; which in turn results in higher
price and prot. With endogenous ; changes in s also a¤ect  =  (t) : While a higher s
directly impacts v negatively, it indirectly impacts v positively through a higher : We
expect the direct e¤ect of s to outweigh its indirect e¤ect through ; so that s is higher
with a higher s: Dene the elasticity of average seller quality, ; with respect to search cost
as " = s
@
@s =
s

@
@t
@t
@s  0: Then
d

s


ds
=
   s@@s
2
 0 () " 
@
@s
s

 1:
Thus, if "  1; then
@v
@s
=
@v
@ (s=)
@ (s=)
@s
=
"  1
 [1  F (v)]
 0; (24)
@p
@s = 
0 (v)
@v
@s  0; and since h
0 (vh)
@vh
@s = [t
g (t) +G (t)] @t

@s from totally di¤er-
entiating the two sides of (17), we have
@
@s
=
@p
@s
+ h
0 (vh)
@vh
@s
  tg (t)
@t
@s
=
@p
@s
+G (t)
@t
@s
 0:
The discussions above lead to:
Remark 1  (t) and p2 increase in s, and so do p

1 and 
; provided 0 (v) < 0 and "  1.
Thus, with endogenous rm quality and reputation, search cost continues to be a key
indicator of competition intensity, with increases in s leading to less competition and high
prices in both periods. However, as we show next, search cost now has unconventional
e¤ects on consumer surplus and welfare. The result below refers to assumption:
There exists some number N > 0 such that  N < 0 (v) < 0 for all v 2 [0; v] ; (25)
21Notice that if 0 (v) = 0; then @t=@s = 0; and hence @ (t) =@s = 0: Thus 0 (v) < 0 is needed in order
for average rm quality to (strictly) increase with s:
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which strengthens condition (6). Condition (25) is satised, for instance, if F (v) is a
uniform distribution.
Proposition 4 (i) Under condition (25), both V  and W  increase in s when s is su¢-
ciently small. (ii) Suppose "  1: Then, when s! s; V  decreases in s; and so does W  if
v0 (h   l)  t:
Therefore, higher search frictions can improve market performance for experience goods,
with both V  and W  initially increasing and eventually decreasing in s under plausible
conditions. To understand this striking result, notice that the e¤ect of a marginal increase
in s on consumer surplus can be decomposed as follows under conditions (25) and "  1:
@V 
@s
=
@
@s
 (v)| {z }
average rm quality e¤ect >0
+ 0 (v)
@v
@s| {z }
search e¢ciency e¤ect in period 1 0
+ h
0 (vh)
@vh
@s| {z }
search e¢ciency e¤ect in period 2 <0
:
An increase in s raises the prot from being a h rm, motivating more rms to invest in
quality and hence average rm quality  is higher in period 1. On the other hand, a higher
s reduces vh and, when "  1; also reduces v ; that is, a higher search cost reduces search
e¢ciency in both periods, which negatively impacts consumer surplus.
When search cost is low, price is low. Thus consumer surplus from an H product,  (v) ;
is high, and the number of high quality rms (that incur x) is small. In such situations,
although a marginal increase in s only raises prices slightly, the prot increase from becoming
a high quality rm is large because of a big boost to its sales in period 2. Hence, a marginal
increase in s leads to a large increase in the number of high-quality rms and in  (i.e.,
@
@s is high), which means that
@
@s (v) is high, whereas the e¤ect on search e¢ciency is
more moderate. Thus the (average rm) quality e¤ect dominates when s is small. On the
other hand, when s is large, price is high. Thus @@s and  (v) are relatively low, so that
the negative search e¢ciency e¤ect dominates.
We can similarly decompose the e¤ect of search cost on total welfare as follows:
@W 
@s
=
@
@s
v| {z }
average rm quality e¤ect > 0
+ 
@v
@s
+ h
@vh
@s| {z }
search e¢ciency e¤ect < 0
+   tg (t)
@t
@s| {z }
investment cost e¤ect < 0
:
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In addition to the average rm quality and search e¢ciency e¤ects, as in the case of consumer
surplus, for W  there is the additional e¤ect of investment cost: a higher search cost
increases the total investment cost for h; because the higher prot from being a high-
quality rm from an increase in s leads to more rms to invest in h: But when s ! 0;
t ! 0; and thus the additional e¤ect of investment cost vanishes so that W  increases
in s; similarly as for V : On the other hand, when s ! s, the highest possible value of
search cost; t ! t and v ! v0: If v0 (h   l) < t; then the investment cost e¤ect (alone)
dominates the average rm quality e¤ect; and hence W  decreases in s; similarly as for V :
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The conclusions in Proposition 4 can be strengthened if we impose additional assumptions.
For example, both V  and W  exhibit an inverted-U shape as s increases when F (v) and
G (x) are uniform distributions under plausible parameter values, as illustrated in Figures
1A and 1B, where F (v) = v100 ; G (x) =
x
50 ; h = 0:8; l = 0:3; and  = 0:8:
The welfare e¤ects of search frictions in our model is in sharp contrast to the result in
the existing search literature, where consumer and total welfare monotonically decrease as
search cost increases. Both endogenous rm quality and the experience nature of goods
are important for the non-monotonic result in our model. If average rm quality in the
market () is exogenously given, higher search costs would only have the negative e¤ect of
reducing search e¢ciency. In our model, an increase in search cost has the additional e¤ect
of inducing a higher ; which positively impacts consumer and total welfare, and it is the
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dominant force when search cost is su¢ciently low. However, for inspection goods, even
with endogenous product quality, both consumer and total welfare would decrease with
search cost, as we show next.
4.3 Comparing to Welfare for Inspection Goods
For inspection goods, same as in the case of experience goods, for a given t the average
rm quality in the market is
 =  (t) = G (t)h + [1 G (t)]l:
The rst-period equilibrium is then the same as in subsection 3.3, with consumers conduct-
ing sequential search under reservation value vI = v and all rms charging p
I
1 = p
I
 : Notice
that a rm of quality  earns prot 
 
vI

in period 1.
Suppose also that, as for experience goods, in period 2 consumers can observe rst-period
consumers product reviews, which reveal each rms :22 Then, in period 2, consumers will
also only search h rms, with reservation value vh: Moreover, from subsection 3.3, h
sellers will charge pI2 =  (vh) ; each earning prot
1
G(t) (vh) in period 2 if the number of
h rms is G (t) : Thus, a h seller earns higher prots in both periods.
In equilibrium, a rm will invest in h if and only if x   ; where the cuto¤ value  is
determined by
h


 
vI

+ 
1
G ()
 (vh)   =
l


 
vI

;
or
 =
h   l
 ()
 (v) + 
1
G ()
 (vh) : (26)
Thus, similarly as for experience goods, a higher s; which increases  (v) and  (vh) ; will
raise average rm quality  () : Industry prot, consumer surplus, and total welfare for the
22Since consumers observe q 2 fH;Lg when searching a rm, they will only purchase if q = H: A
consumers review in this case is still about whether a rms product quality q is H or L; if q = L; even
though she can avoid to purchase the product, the consumer has wasted a costly search.
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two periods together are respectively
I =  (v)+ (vh) 
Z 
0
xdG (x) ; V I =  (v)+ (vh) ; W
I = v+vh 
Z 
0
xdG (x) ;
where recall  (v) = v    (v) :
The impact of search cost on consumer welfare under inspection goods is always negative
(provided "  1 so that d

s


=ds  0), because the positive average rm quality e¤ect for
experience goods is absent:
@V I
@s
= 0 (v)
@v
@s| {z }
search e¢ciency e¤ect in period 1 0
+ 0 (vh)
@vh
@s| {z }
search e¢ciency e¤ect in period 2 <0
< 0:
Similarly,
@W I
@s
= 
@v
@s
+ h
@vh
@s| {z }
search e¢ciency e¤ect <0
 g ()
@
@s| {z }
investment cost e¤ect <0
< 0:
We thus have:
Remark 2 For inspection goods, consumer and total welfare monotonically decrease in
search cost, in contrast to the result for experience goods.
For both inspection and experience goods, an increase in search cost leads to higher price
and hence to higher returns for investment in quality because only h rms make sales in
period 2. However, consumers can avoid the loss from a low-quality product for inspection
goods but not for experience goods. Thus, the marginal benet from increasing rm quality
() in period 1 due to a higher s is lower for inspection goods. This explains why a higher s
can be benecial to consumers and total welfare for experience but not for inspection goods.
4.4 Equilibrium vs. E¢cient Quality Investment
We further investigate how the equilibrium quality investment compares with the social
optimum, by comparing the cuto¤ values for quality investment (t) in these two cases. The
result below shows that the equilibrium cuto¤ (t) can be higher or lower than the e¢cient
value (to) when search cost is su¢ciently high or low, respectively.
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Proposition 5 Given s 2 (0; s) ; there exists to > 0 that maximizes total welfare. Moreover,
provided to < t; there exists a unique  > 0 such that t  to if s   but t > to if  < s  s:
An increase in t results in a higher proportion of rms that invest. This leads to a
higher expected quality of sellers and hence higher welfare in the rst period, as reected
by a higher v . On the other hand, investment is costly, and a higher t leads to higher
investment cost
R t
0 xdG (x). A socially optimal t
o balances these two opposing forces, with
the marginal benet from a higher  being equal to the marginal cost of increasing t. From
the denition of t in (38), we note that t > 0 is independent of l whereas t
o ! 0 if l ! h:
Thus to < t when (h   l) is relatively small so that the benet from high quality (h) is
more limited.
When a rm chooses to invest in quality (to incur x), it internalizes neither the positive
impact on consumers nor the negative impact on other rms prots from a higher . When
s is low, consumers have strong search incentives and v p is high, so that a higher average
rm quality  (i.e. a higher t) has a large impact on  (v   p) and the positive consumer
externality dominates. Therefore t < to when s is low. On the other hand, when s is high,
v   p is low and welfare gain from increasing  is relatively small (so t
o is relatively low),
whereas price is high and the negative prot shifting e¤ect tends to dominate, so that t
tends to exceed to:
In the literature on experience goods (without consumer search), product quality is usu-
ally ine¢ciently low because the market often creates other distortions (such as ine¢ciently
high price) in order to induce rms to improve quality. This is consistent with our result
that equilibrium product quality is decient (t  to) when search cost s is su¢ciently small.
However, our result also shows that there can be socially excessive quality investment in
the presence of (substantial) search frictions.
It can be veried that a result similar to Proposition 5 also holds for inspection goods.
Thus, quality provision is socially decient when s is low but possibly excessive when s is
high, for both experience and inspection goods in search markets. One notable di¤erence
is that the prot-shifting e¤ect of a rms quality investment arises only in period 2 for
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experience goods, whereas it also arises in period 1 for inspection goods, because consumers
purchases in period 1 are a¤ected by product quality only for the latter. This suggests that
equilibrium product quality is more likely to be decient for experience than for inspection
goods.
5. EFFECTS OF AN INTERMEDIARY
In many markets, consumers search their products through an intermediary that serves
as a search platform, such as Amazon.com and booking.com. We now extend our model
to include such an intermediary.23 A prot-maximizing intermediary can a¤ect market
outcomes by charging sellers fees for being on its platform, which may in turn a¤ect the
(average) quality of sellers on the marketplace, search e¢ciency, and market price.24 We
shall show that the intermediary can improve welfare by screening out low-quality sellers,
especially when it can commit to a relatively small listing space on the platform, but it may
lower welfare when lacking such commitment ability.
Suppose that a monopoly intermediary, M; can charge each seller (k; ) ; where k  0 is
a xed fee and   0 a percentage of the transaction price. Sellers that pay the fees will
have access to consumers associated with M . We further assume that there is a minimum
platform size 
 2 (0; 1]number of sellers to be listed on the platformthatM can commit
to.25
The timing of the extended model is as follows. M rst chooses (k; ) : In period 1, after
23Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) study position auctions by a monopoly search engine,
emphasizing their benecial role as information intermediary. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) pioneered the
study of coordination economies in retail market search. Others have shown that search intermediaries need
not (optimally) improve search e¢ciency (e.g. Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; White, 2013; de Cornière and Taylor,
2014). None of the above analyze experience goods.
24 In addition to providing a search platform, the intermediary may publish product reviews by customers.
The intermediary can thus be a reputation carrier, enabling rms to establish quality reputation when
product reviews are otherwise unavailable.
25A similar assumption is adopted by, for example, Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) under a continuum of sellers,
or Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) under a nite number of sellers.
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its realization of x; each seller chooses whether to pay the fees to sell on the platform and
decides whether to invest x to become a seller with h. Sellers on the platform then set
prices, consumers sequentially search sellers on the platform, and transactions are made.
In period 2, consumer reviews from previous period are available to the current cohort
of consumers. Sellers on the platform set prices, and consumers again sequentially search
sellers on the platform and possibly make purchases. Everything else about the model is
the same as in section 2.26 Notice that sellers not on the platform are not active in either
period.
Given the average rm quality on the platform, ; which is endogenously determined by
the rms on the platform who will invest in h; the rms pricing and consumers search
strategies are the same as in section 4, una¤ected by the values of k and : In particular,
at a uniform-price equilibrium, the optimal consumer search rule is again given by (19),
whereas a seller will choose p to maximize (1  ) pD (p; p) ; the solution of which does not
depend on :
There are two possible types of equilibria for a given 
; depending on its value: (1) a
separating equilibrium in which all sellers on the platform are of high quality (h), and (2) a
pooling equilibrium in which both high and low quality sellers are present on the platform.
First, at a separating equilibrium, M charges high fees such that only high quality sellers
will be able to earn positive prot. Suppose that in equilibrium, there is a cuto¤ value tk
such that only sellers with x  tk choose to invest in h and pay to be listed on the platform
while other sellers are o¤ the platform and inactive. In this case, in equilibrium M solves
the following problem (P1):
max
(k;)
	 = kG (tk) + h (vh) (1 + ) ;
subject to
(1  )
1
G (tk)
h (vh)  k < 0; (27)
(1  )
1
G (tk)
h (vh) (1 + )  k   x  0 for x  tk; (28)
26For convenience, we assume that each search still costs s. The analysis can be easily extended to
situations where s becomes lower when consumers search on the platform.
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where the rst constraint ensures that a seller with l has no incentive to be on the platform
(being able to sell only in period 1) and the second constraint ensures that sellers with low
x nd it protable to acquire h and sell on the platform for two periods.
Dene t
 and t^ respectively as
G (t
) = 
; t^ =
1
G
 
t^
h (vh) (1 + ) ; (29)
and, for t dened in (38), we assume max

t
; t^
	
< t < x: Then, exactly 
 rms will be
listed on the platform if and only if all rms with x  t
 pay (k; ) and invest x; whereas
G
 
t^

is the mass of rms who will acquire h and be on the platform if k =  = 0 and
 = h:
Lemma 1 Suppose t
  t^: There is a separating equilibrium in which M optimally sets
 = 0 and
k =
1
G (t
)
h (vh) (1 + )  t
; (30)
whereas only rms with x  t
 choose to acquire h and sell on the platform. Moreover,
the presence of the intermediary improves welfare if t
  t
; with t dened in (17) and
t < t^ .
Given (relatively small) 
 so that t^  t
; M can screen out low quality rms by charging
high fees and thus organize a platform that contains only high quality sellers. At this equi-
librium, search e¢ciency is higher in period 1 (and is unchanged in period 2) as compared
to the market equilibrium withoutM ; if additionally t
  t
; then the total investment cost
on quality is also (weakly) lowerand hence total welfare must be higherat the separating
equilibrium.
We next consider an alternative possible equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium, which arises
when t
 > t^: In this equilibrium, there is a cuto¤ value tk such that only rms with x  tk
choose to acquire h, but all rms will pay to be on the platform. M solves the following
maximization problem (P2):
max
k;
	 = k +  [ (tk) (v) + h (vh)] ;
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subject to
(1  )  (tk) (v)  k  0; (31)
(1  ) 
1
G (tk)
h (vh)  x  0 for x  tk; (32)
where the two constraints ensure respectively that rms with l are willing to pay (k; )
and that rms with x  tk will additionally choose to acquire h. The result below refers
to condition

 (v)  
0 (v)
s

1
1  F (v)

(h   l)  t
 (33)
for  =  (t) ; which holds if (h   l) is not too large.
Lemma 2 Suppose t
 > t^ and (33) holds. Then, there exists a pooling equilibrium with
tk 2 (0; t
). M optimally chooses
k = (1  )  (tk) (v) ; 
 = 1  tkG (t

k)
1
h
 (vh) ;
and all rms choose to be on the platform. However, only rms with x  tk choose to
acquire h.
When the minimum platform size 
 is relatively large and (h   l) relatively small,
there is a pooling equilibrium in which M nds optimal to accommodate both high and
low quality rms, with positive k and : Due to  > 0; however, tk < t
 and the average
rm quality in period 1 is lower than when M is absent. The intermediary can thus lower
welfare if it leads to a pooling equilibrium, because the market provision of quality may be
already too low without M .
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, noting t < t^ and recalling from Proposition 5 that
t < to if s < ; we have
Proposition 6 For the extended model with M , assume max

t
; t^
	
< t: (i) If t
 < t^; then
it is an equilibrium that only rms with x  t
 acquire h and list on M , with M improving
total welfare. (ii) If t
 > t^; then it is an equilibrium for all rms to list on M but only
29
those with x  tk < t
 to acquire h; and if s < ; then t

k < t
 < to; so that the market
provision of quality is further below the social optimum.27
The presence of a prot-maximizing search intermediary can thus either increase or de-
crease welfare.28 Notice that t
 < t
 is more likely to hold if s is relatively large, while
t
 > t^ and s <  are more likely to hold if s is relatively small. Therefore, the presence
of the intermediary is more likely to increase welfare when it can commit to a relatively
small minimum listing size or under relatively large search cost; but the intermediary can
reduce welfare when the minimum listing space on the search platform is relatively large
and search cost is relatively low.29
6. CONCLUSION
The standard view in economics has been that decreases in search friction increase welfare
in consumer markets. This paper shows that the impact of search friction on market perfor-
mance is more nuanced, depending on the observability of product quality before purchase.
In our setting, while for inspection goods a reduction in search cost is indeed always ben-
ecial, for experience goods it will decrease both consumer and total welfare if search cost
is already low. We also nd that the market provision of product quality is decient when
search cost is low but can be excessive when it is high. Moreover, a search intermediary
can improve welfare by committing to a su¢ciently limited space for displaying sellers, but
it may reduce welfare if it is unable to do so.
27 In this case, total welfare, same as W  from (22), is likelybut not necessarilylower under tk than
under t. If W  is monotonically increasing in t for t < to; which for example is true when F () and G ()
are uniform distributions, then W  is unambiguously lower under tk than under t
 if tk < t
 < to:
28As discussed in subsection 4.3, for inspection goods a rms prot is higher when it has higher quality.
Thus, with M it is likely that a separating equilibrium prevails, with only the high-quality rms being
present on the search platform in both periods. The intermediary will then improve welfare, as in Chen and
He (2011) and Athey and Ellison (2011). To focus on our main interest, we have not analyzed this case.
29We have veried numerically that, for example, if F (v) and G (x) are both uniform distributions, then
there are plausible parameter values under which max

t
; t^
	
< t and the intermediary increases welfare
when 
 is small but decreases welfare when 
 is relatively large.
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The analytical results of our model are especially relevant in the contemporary economy,
where transactions are increasingly conducted through online markets where search cost is
low and product quality may be di¢cult to observe before purchase. Online markets are thus
more susceptible to low-quality sellers and low-quality products than traditional markets.
Our results suggest that further diminishing search cost and increasing competition need not
improve the performance of these markets. Rather, regulatory policies can play important
roles in protecting consumers and increase welfare. One such policy is to impose minimum
quality standards, when feasible, to prohibit the sale of low-quality products. Another
possibility is to provide stronger consumer rights for product return and other remedies to
low quality. Product return is often costly to consumers for the time and e¤orts involved,
and it is not always feasible because a quality problem may not be detected promptly after
purchase. But when it is feasible, product return can e¤ectively change the nature of a
product from an experience to an inspection good, improving e¢ciency. A related issue is
how to design product liability to provide e¢cient incentives to invest in product quality,
both for producers and for intermediaries that can screen out low-quality sellers. We believe
that these are important issues for future research.
APPENDIX
The appendix contains proofs for Propositions 1, 3, 4, 5 and for Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. It su¢ces to show that there can be no equilibrium where h
and l rms charge di¤erent prices. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium
where h and l rms charge ph 6= pl: Then the equilibrium prot for the two types of rms
must be equal, h = l; because otherwise a rm of the type with a lower prot, say, l;
can deviate to ph and increase its prot. So suppose ph 6= pl but h = l: We show that
this leads to a contradiction.
Let each consumers reservation values be vh and vl at a h and a l rm, respectively.
Then, since the consumer has the same continuation value at both types of rms, we have
hvh   ph = lvl   pl: (34)
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Moreover, reservation values vh and vl satisfy the following equation
G
Z v
vh
h (v   vh) f (v) dv + (1 G)
Z v
vl
l (v   vl) f (v) dv = s; (35)
in which the LHS is the expected gain from one more search: When the consumer is currently
at a h rm (having vh and ph), with probability G she will encounter another h rm with
gain (hv   ph)  (hvh   ph) = h (v   vh) ; conditional on her v > vh from the new rm
searched, while with probability (1 G) the consumer will encounter a l rm with gain
(lv   pl)   (hvh   ph) ; which equals l (v   vl) from (34), conditional on v > vl: The
argument is similar when the consumer is currently at a l rm (having vl and pl).
Next, given consumers search behavior and the pricing strategies of other rms, if a h
rm deviates with price p in the neighborhoods of ph; under our extended passive-belief
assumption consumers will believe that the deviation is made by the h rm. Hence, at
the deviating price p; a consumer with value v at the h rm will purchase if hv   p 
(G) [hvh   ph] + (1 G) [lvl   pl] = hvh   ph: The rms demand from any visiting
consumer is thus 1   F

vh +
p ph
h

: Solving maxp p
h
1  F

vh +
p ph
h
i
; with p = ph in
equilibrium, we obtain ph = h (vh) : Similarly, pl = l (vl) : Therefore
hvh   ph = h [vh    (vh)] ; lvl   pl = l [vl    (vl)] ;
and from (34) we obtain
h [vh    (vh)] = l [vl    (vl)] : (36)
Furthermore:
h =
ph [1  F (vh)]
1  (G)F (vh)  (1 G)F (vl)
; l =
pl [1  F (vl)]
1  (G)F (vh)  (1 G)F (vl)
: (37)
If ph > pl, then h = l implies vh > vl; which further implies h [vh    (vh)] > l [vl    (vl)]
since 0 ()  0: This contradicts (36). If ph = h (vh) < pl = l (vl) ; then from h > l
and 0 ()  0 we have vh  vl and hence
hvh   h (vh) > lvl   l (vl) ;
again contradicting (36).
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Proof of Proposition 3. The RHS of equation (17) increases in t; whereas the LHS of
equation (17) is larger than the RHS when t ! 0: Moreover, dene t as
h (vh (s)) = tG (t) : (38)
Since  (vh) weakly increases in s; we have h (vh (s))  tG (t) for all s 2 (0; s) : Thus,
the LHS of equation (17) is no higher than the RHS when t ! t. Therefore, there exists
t 2 (t; t) that solves equation (17):
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) First, from (21),
@V 
@s
=
@
@s
 (v) + 
0 (v)
@v
@s
+ h
0 (vh)
@vh
@s
:
Since
@v
@(s=) =  
1
[1 F (v)]
from (4) and from (23):
@
@s
=
@
@t
@t
@s
= (h   l) g (t
)
 0 (vh)
G (t) + tg (t)
1
[1  F (vh)]
:
With
@v
@s =
" 1
[1 F (v)]
from (24) and @(s=)@s =
1 "
 , we then have
@V 
@s
= (h   l) g (t
)
 0 (vh)
G (t) + tg (t)
 (v)
[1  F (vh)]
+
0 (v) ("  1)
[1  F (v)]
  
0 (vh)
[1  F (vh)]
(39)

1
[1  F (vh)]
2
4(h   l)  0 (vh) (v)G(t)
g(t) + t

  0 (v)  
0 (vh)
3
5 ;
where the inequality holds because "  0 and [1  F (v)]  [1  F (vh)] : When s ! 0:
G(t)
g(t) ! 0; vh ! v; v ! v; 
0 (v) < 0;  (v) ! v; and (h   l)
 0(vh)(v)
G(t)
g(t)
+t
! 1: Thus,
since 0 (v) = 1  0 (v) is bounded for any v; we have @V

@s > 0 as s! 0:
Next, from (22),
@W 
@s
=
@
@s
v + 
@v
@s
+ h
@vh
@s
  tg (t)
@t
@s
= [v (h   l)  t] g (t)
@t
@s
+ ("  1)
1
1  F (v)
  
1
1  F (vh)
= [v (h   l)  t
]
 0 (vh)
t + G(t
)
g(t)
1
1  F (vh)
+ ("  1)
1
1  F (v)
  
1
1  F (vh)
>
1
1  F (vh)
8<
:[v (h   l)  t]  0 (vh)t + G(t)g(t)   1  
9=
; ;
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where the last inequality is due to "  0 and v  vh: When s ! 0; t
 ! 0; G(t
)
g(t) ! 0;
v ! v; and hence [v (h   l)  t
]  
0(vh)
t+
G(t)
g(t)
!1: Thus @W

@s > 0 as s! 0:
(ii) First, @vh@s < 0; 
0 (v)  0;
@v
@s  0 if "  1; and, when s! s;  (v) = [v    (v)]!
0: Hence, from (39), if "  1; @V

@s < 0 as s! s:
Next, when s! s; v ! v0; t
 ! t; and hence @W

@s < 0 if
t  v0 (h   l) and "  1:
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall @@t = (h   l) g (t) and
@v
@ =
s
2
1
1 F (v)
: Thus,
@W 
@t
=
@ (v)
@
@
@t
  tg (t)
=

v +
s

1
1  F (v)

(h   l)  t

g (t) : (40)
Clearly @W

@t jt=0 > 0: Moreover, for given s > 0; v is bounded away from v: Thus,
@W 
@t < 0
if t is su¢ciently high: Hence, there exists to 2 (0; x) such that W  is maximized at to:
Moreover, from (17), t increases in s and t ! t if s! s: Therefore, if to < t; there exists
a unique  such that t  to when s  ; and t > to when  < s  s:
Proof of Lemma 1. In equilibrium, constraint (28) is binding when x = tk and thus
(1  )
1
G (tk)
h (vh) (1 + ) = k + tk:
Hence,
	 = h (vh) (1 + )  tkG (tk) ;
which decreases in tk: Thus, the intermediary optimally sets (k
; ) such that the rm with
x = t
 is indi¤erent between being on and o¤ the platform:
k = (1  )
1
G (t
)
h
1  F (vh)
f (vh)
(1 + )  t
:
Moreover, substituting k into constraint (27), we have
 < t
G (t
)
1
h
f (vh)
1  F (vh)
:
Therefore,  = 0 and k solve problem (P1) and induce the separating equilibrium, which
improves search e¢ciency in period 1. If additionally t
  t
; then the total investment
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cost on quality is not higher in the separating equilibrium than in the equilibrium without
the intermediary, and hence total welfare must be higher in the former.
Proof of Lemma 2. Constraint (32) is binding when x = tk; with
tk = (1  ) 
1
G (tk)
h (vh) : (41)
Since RHS of (41) decreases in tk and ; it follows that tk decreases in : In equilibrium,
(31) is binding. Moreover, from (41),
tkG (tk) = (1  ) h (vh) :
Thus, the intermediarys objective function becomes, for  =  (tk) ;
	 =  (tk) (v)  tkG (tk) + h (vh) : (42)
Since
@v
@ =
1
[1 F (v)]
s
2
and @@tk = (h   l) g (tk) ; we have
@	
@tk
=

 (v) + 
0 (v)
@v
@

@
@tk
 G (tk)  tkg (tk)
=

 (v)  
0 (v)
s

1
1  F (v)

(h   l) g (tk) G (tk)  tkg (tk)
=

 (v)  
0 (v)
s

1
1  F (v)

(h   l)  tk

g (tk) G (tk) : (43)
Since 0 (v)  0; we have
@	
@tk
jtk!0 > 0: Also, under (33),
@	
@tk
jtk!t < 0: Therefore, there
exists tk < t
 that maximizes 	; with  > 0:
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